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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-1379 
___________ 
 
JESSE BOND, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
DAVID HORNE, Corrections Officer (C.O.) State  
Correctional Institution at Greene (SCI-Greene);  
Lieutenant JAMES LIPSCOMB, State Correctional Institution  
at Pittsburgh, (SCI-Pittsburgh); JENKINS, First Name Unknown (FNU), Sergeant SCI-
Greene, Waynesburg, PA; C.O. BASINGER, FNU, SCI-Greene, Waynesburg, PA.;  
C.O. KIRK, FNU, SCI-Greene, Waynesburg, PA; 
DAN DAVIS, Superintendent’s Assistant, SCI-Greene, Waynesburg, PA;  
LOUIS FOLINO, Superintendent, SCI-Greene, Waynesburg, PA; 
FREDDI NUNEZ, Hearing Examiner, SCI-Pine Grove, Indiana, PA 
All defendants were served in their individual capacities 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-11-cv-01342) 
District Judge:  Honorable David S. Cercone 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 22, 2014 
Before:  RENDELL, GREENAWAY, JR. and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: January 27, 2014) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
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PER CURIAM 
 Jesse Bond appeals pro se from the District Court’s order dismissing his civil 
rights complaint.  We will vacate in part the District Court’s order and remand for further 
proceedings.  
I. 
 Appellant Jesse Bond is a Pennsylvania state prisoner who, at all times relevant to 
this case, was incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Greene.  Bond’s claims 
stem from a 2005 incident in which Corrections Officer David Horne allegedly assaulted 
Bond.  Following the incident, Bond sued Horne and other prison officials, and the 
parties eventually agreed to a settlement.  According to Bond, that settlement included an 
oral agreement that the prison would prevent Horne from interacting with Bond and 
would transfer Bond to a different state correctional institution.  However, 54 days after 
the settlement (but before Bond had been transferred), Horne delivered a meal to Bond’s 
cell.  Bond reacted by throwing the food back towards the meal cart, some of which 
landed on Horne.  Horne then filed a misconduct report, alleging that Bond had assaulted 
him. 
 After a hearing in which Bond did not dispute throwing food at the meal cart, 
Hearing Examiner Freddi Nunez decided that Bond “pleaded guilty” to assault and 
sentenced him to 30 days of disciplinary custody.  Bond filed a first level appeal pursuant 
to the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections’ Inmate Grievance Procedure Policy No. 
DC-ADM 801, which the Program Review Committee denied.  Although he 
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subsequently filed a second level appeal, he never received a response from 
Superintendent Louis Folino or any other prison official.  After the time for ruling on the 
second-level appeal had passed, Bond sent a follow-up letter to Folino.  In that letter, 
Bond requested that any response be forwarded to him at the prison where he was to be 
transferred.  Bond never received a response to that letter or to his appeal. 
 Bond then filed a civil rights complaint in the District Court, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, which he later amended.  His amended complaint alleged, among other claims, 
that Horne and other defendants retaliated against him for filing suit after the 2005 
incident.  The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that (1) Bond had failed to 
exhaust his claims in the prison remedy system, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) and 
DC-ADM 804, and (2) the claims otherwise lacked merit. 
 The Magistrate Judge who was assigned to the case found that Bond had failed to 
exhaust his administrative remedies under DC-ADM 804 and recommended granting the 
defendants’ motion to dismiss.  Bond objected to that recommendation, asserting that the 
Magistrate Judge incorrectly analyzed his claim as an inmate grievance requiring 
exhaustion under DC-ADM 804.  Bond added that he had exhausted his remedies through 
the prison’s disciplinary appeals process set forth in DC-ADM 801.  The District Judge 
agreed with Bond that the claims needed to have been exhausted under DC-ADM 801 
rather than DC-ADM 804, but still found that Bond’s claims were unexhausted.  The 
District Court then dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice.  Bond timely 
appealed from the District Court’s judgment. 
4 
 
 
II. 
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise plenary 
review over the District Court’s dismissal of Bond’s amended complaint.  See Tourscher 
v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999).  To survive a motion to dismiss, a 
plaintiff must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).  The complaint must contain “factual content that 
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant[s are] liable for the 
misconduct alleged.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 
U.S. at 556).    In conducting our review, we liberally construe Bond’s pro se filings.  See 
Higgs v. Att’y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011). 
III. 
The District Court dismissed Bond’s claims as unexhausted.  An inmate is 
prohibited from bringing a civil rights suit alleging specific acts of unconstitutional 
conduct by prison officials “until such administrative remedies as are available are 
exhausted.”  42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).  We recently stated in Small v. Camden County,728 
F.3d 265 (3d Cir. 2013), that the administrative appeals process is unavailable to an 
inmate when he fails to receive a response to or decision on his grievances.  728 F.3d at 
273.  Here, Bond never received a decision on his second level appeal, and the 
Superintendent failed to respond to Bond’s follow-up letter.  The administrative appeals 
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process was therefore not available to Bond.
1
  See id. at 273-74.   
Appellees assert that the District Court’s judgment should nonetheless be 
affirmed, as Bond has not stated alleged a facially plausible claim for retaliation or 
breach of contract.  An inmate asserting a retaliation claim must demonstrate that “(1) he 
engaged in constitutionally protected conduct, (2) he was subjected to adverse actions by 
a state actor, and (3) the protected activity was a substantial motivating factor in the state 
actor’s decision to take the adverse action.”  Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 
(3d Cir. 2011).  If the inmate has made his prima facie case, the prison officials may still 
prevail by showing that they “would have made the same decision absent the protected 
conduct for reasons reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.”  Rauser v. 
Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 334 (3d Cir. 2001).  
Here, Bond alleged that he filed a lawsuit in 2005 after he was assaulted by Horne, 
and that he agreed to settle that case in 2010.  Filing and settling a lawsuit is a protected 
activity.  See Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 653 (3d Cir. 2002).  Bond also alleged 
that Horne filed a misconduct report against him in 2010, shortly after the settlement 
agreement.  As a result of the misconduct report, Bond spent 30 days in disciplinary 
custody.  That sanction may be sufficient to constitute an “adverse action” for retaliation 
purposes.  See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 2000) (declining to hold 
that placement in restricted housing “can never amount to adverse action,” and stating 
                                              
1
 In their briefs, both parties have recognized and conceded that, in light of Small, Bond 
substantially complied with the prison’s administrative remedies. 
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that “whether a prisoner-plaintiff has met that prong of his retaliation claim . . . will 
depend on the facts of the particular case”); see also Rauser, 241 F.3d at 333 (stating that 
an inmate satisfies the “adverse action” requirement “by demonstrating that the action 
was sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional 
rights”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  Finally, to demonstrate the 
requisite causal connection, Bond provided the affidavit of a fellow prisoner, Robert L. 
Cook, Jr.  Cook stated that, on the morning of the incident giving rise to the misconduct 
report, another inmate overheard Horne tell someone that Horne planned to “get even” 
with Bond for the settlement agreement.  This evidence, if true, would certainly establish 
the requisite causal connection between Bond’s protected activity and the alleged adverse 
action taken against him.  Bond has therefore alleged a prima facie case of retaliation 
against Horne.
2
     
The burden must then shift to the defendants to prove that they would have 
sanctioned Bond “absent the protected conduct for reasons reasonably related to a 
legitimate penological interest.”  Rauser, 241 F.3d at 334.  In their motion to dismiss, the 
defendants claimed that Bond’s admission of the facts contained in the misconduct report 
                                              
2
 We note that Bond’s retaliation claim does not directly implicate the personal 
involvement of six of the seven other defendants, and therefore was properly dismissed 
insofar as it named them as defendants.  See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207-
08 (3d Cir. 1988) (stating that “[an individual government] defendant in a civil rights 
action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs,” and that a prison official’s 
secondary review of an inmate’s grievance or appeal is not sufficient to demonstrate the 
requisite personal involvement).  To the extent that Nunez was directly involved, Bond 
has not stated that Nunez possessed a retaliatory motive. 
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undermined his claim for retaliation.  Bond countered that he only admitted to hitting the 
food off the cart, not that he assaulted Horne.  While a finding of guilt in a prison 
disciplinary proceeding may well be sufficient in certain circumstances to satisfy the 
defendants’ burden, see, e.g., Carter v. McGrady, 292 F.3d 152, 159 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(“Given the quantum of evidence of Carter’s misconduct, we cannot say that the prison 
officials’ decision to discipline Carter for his violations of prison policy was not within 
the ‘broad discretion’ that we must afford them.”); Henderson v. Baird, 29 F.3d 464, 469 
(8th Cir. 1994) (concluding that, because the finding of guilt in the inmate’s disciplinary 
hearing was based on “some evidence,” that finding “essentially checkmates his 
retaliation claim”), we conclude that it is not sufficient here. 
Bond, unlike the litigants in previous cases, was unable to appeal the finding of 
guilt beyond the first level of administrative review because the administrative appeals 
process was not available to him.  While we make no finding as to Bond’s actual guilt of 
the misconduct charged, it is at least possible that the finding of guilt might have been 
overturned had he been able to pursue an administrative appeal.  Moreover, unlike the 
vast majority of our previous cases on this issue, Bond’s amended complaint was 
dismissed on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.  At least one other court of appeals has found that 
point to be significant.  See Thomas v. Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 441-42 (6th Cir. 2007) 
(concluding that “it makes little sense” to apply the burden-shifting aspect of the 
retaliation standard at the pleading stage).  Because the District Court relied only on 
Bond’s purported failure to exhaust his administrative appeals, the District Court has not 
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yet addressed the merits of Bond’s retaliation claim.  We think it should do so in the first 
instance. 
Bond also alleged that the defendants violated his right to procedural due process.  
“To prevail on a procedural due process claim, a litigant must show (1) that the state 
deprived him of a protected interest in life, liberty, or property and (2) that the 
deprivation occurred without due process of law.”  Burns v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 544 F.3d 
279, 285 (3d Cir. 2008).  Prisoners generally have a protected liberty interest only in 
“freedom from restraint” that “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in 
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 
(1995).  Here, Bond alleged that the defendants filed a false misconduct report, refused to 
hear and adjudicate his second level appeal of that misconduct report, and subjected him 
to 30 days in disciplinary custody.  We have previously held that an allegedly fraudulent 
misconduct report and related disciplinary sanctions lasting longer than 30 days fell short 
of a due process violation.  See, e.g., Smith, 293 F.3d at 653-54.  We have also 
recognized, however, that “prison disciplinary proceedings may . . . constitute a denial of 
due process in the context of a civil rights action under § 1983 when they are instituted 
for the sole purpose of retaliating against an inmate for his/her exercise of a constitutional 
right.”  Id. at 653.  We leave it to the District Court to consider in the first instance this 
final point when it examines Bond’s retaliation claim on remand. 
Bond’s remaining federal law claims lack merit.  His equal protection claim fails 
because he has not demonstrated that he was treated differently than any similarly 
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situated prisoners.  See Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1478 (3d Cir. 1990).  
Bond’s 42 U.S.C. § 1985 conspiracy claim fails because he did not allege that the 
defendants entered into a conspiracy motivated by “‘some racial, or perhaps otherwise 
class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus.’”  Farber v. City of Paterson, 440 F.3d 
131, 135 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971)) 
(emphasis omitted).  Bond also asserted that the defendants violated his right to be free 
from cruel and unusual punishment by “provoking” him, issuing a misconduct report, 
holding a hearing on that misconduct report, finding him guilty, and transferring him to 
disciplinary custody.  However, Bond failed to state a prima facie claim for a violation of 
the Eighth Amendment as he did not allege any danger to or interference with his health, 
safety, or basic needs.  See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (stating that a 
prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when his “act or omission . . . result[s] in 
the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,” and does so with 
“deliberate indifference” to the inmate’s health or safety). 
To the extent Bond raised state law claims for harassment, filing a false 
misconduct report, breach of contract, and extortion, these appear to be state law claims 
rather than federal law claims.  We leave it to the District Court to determine whether to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). 
Accordingly, we will vacate in part the judgment of the District Court insofar as it 
dismissed Bond’s retaliation, due process, and state law claims, and remand for further 
proceedings. 
